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FRAUD ON THE INNKEEPER: THE NEED FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Every state has recognized the need for criminal legislation for the
protection of the innkeeper or hotel owner against fraudulent guests.'
The problems in this area are unique due to the transient nature of the
guests, the general and unqualified extension of credit, and the fact
that the "commodity" dispensed is in the form of good will and intangible services rather than tangible property. The scope of this note
will be confined to the legal problems of the innkeeper2 concerning
fraudulent guests, with particular emphasis on the weakness and need
for improvement of present legislation in this field.
A conservative estimate indicates 'that Florida hotel and motel
owners were defrauded to the extent of over a half-million dollars
in 1962.3 This problem is particularly pressing in Florida because of
the influx of the professional "skip" artist during the lucrative winter
season. Other states are confronted with the problem in degrees vary1. ALA. CODE tit. 24, §§18, 19 (Supp. 1961); ALAsKA STAT. §11.20.480
(1962); A=uz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-818 (Supp. 1963); Aux. STAT. ANN. §§411908,-1909 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE §587; CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§68-1-1 to
-1-3 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §53-371 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§602 (1953); FLA. STAT. §§509.151, .161, .162 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. §§529903 to -9905 (1933); HAwAII REv. LAws §272-1 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§18-3107, -3108 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 71, §§31, 32 (1961); INn. ANN.
STAT. §§37-201, -202, -204, -205, -206 (1949); IowA CODE §§718.7, .8 (1963);
Kw. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§36-201, -203, -206, -207, -208 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT.
§§373.340, 434.290 (1963); LA. REv. STAT. §§21:21, :22 (1950); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN., ch. 100, §§42-46 (1954); MND.
ANN. CODE art. 27, §§161, 162 (1957);
MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 140, §§12-14 (1932); Micn. Comp. LAws §§28.502-.504
(1948); MINN. STAT. §§327.05-.08 (1961); Miss. CODE ANN. §§7154-7158
(1952); Mo. REV. STAT. §419.080 (1959); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §94-3550
(1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§41-124, -125, -127, -128 (1960); NEV. REv. STAT.
§§108.480, 205.445 (1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §580:6 (1955); N.J. REv.
STAT. §2A:111-19 (1951); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§40A-16-16 to -18 (Supp. 1963);
N.Y. PEN. LAw §925; N.C. GmT. STAT. §§14-110 (1953), 44-30 (1950); OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. §2911.14 (Page 1954); Oxr... STAT. tit. 21, §1503 (1961); OnE.
REV. STAT. §165.230 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4871 (1945); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. §11-18-26 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §35-3, -5, -6 (1962); S.D. CODE
§18.4206 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §§62-707 to -709 (1955); TEX. PEN. CODE
art. 1551 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. §§38-2-2, 73-31-1 (Supp. 1963); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, §2010 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. §18.1-120 (1960); WAsH. REv. CODE

§19.48.110 (1957); W. VA. CODE ANN. §4981 (1961); Wis. STAT. §943.21
(1961); WyO. STAT. ANN. §§33-249 to -251 (1957).
2. The term innkeeper shall hereinafter be used to refer collectively to hotel,
motel, motor court, apartment house, boarding house, rooming house, inn, trailer
park, and restaurant proprietors, keepers, and managers.

. Interview With David Arpin, Executive Vice President of the Florida
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ing with their volume of tourism. Certainly the innkeeper can bring
a civil suit against these people, but as a practical matter, the judgments are often uncollectible, leaving recovery at a minimum. As a
result fraud remains widespread.
Most states recognize the innkeeper's common law lien4 on guest's
baggage. Innkeeper's lien statutes generally provide for a specified
waiting period on the part of the proprietor in order to allow a guest
to reclaim his baggage by settling his bill, followed by a public sale or
auction of the baggage and other personal belongings remaining unclaimed. Waiting periods range from a high of six months5 to a low
of ten days. 6 Requirements for notification or publication vary from
that of the sending of a registered letter to the address on the guest
register and posting a public notice for four weeks, 7 to a mere ten days
notice by poster.S Florida requires a ninety-day waiting period and
thirty-days notice by mail and newspaper.9 This remedy, however,
proves relatively ineffectual against the skip artist who obtains accommodations by the use of very inexpensive (and often empty) luggage,
or surreptitiously exits with inexpensive luggage after having accumulated numerous charges. Also, the innkeeper who, in order to protect
his lien' 0 against surreptitious removal of baggage, "locks out" a guest
faces possible civil or criminal liability if he acts too hastily." Thus,
civil remedies afford little practical protection against the "professional
skipper." Without strong criminal legislation the innkeeper's only real
protection is to require payment in advance, an undesirable and inexpedient practice for his type of business.
General larceny statutes' 2 provide little protection, for they are
applicable only when the guest actually departs with property of the
establishment. Fraud and false pretense statutes are similarly unsuited to the needs of the innkeeper, for they require that the frauduHotel and Motel Association, in Jacksonville, Florida, Nov. 7, 1968.
4. Ruff v. Hanson, 222 Ala. 676, 138 So. 716 (1931); Halsey v. Svitack, 168
Minn. 253, 203 N.W. 968 (1925). See FA, STAT. §§85.18, .19 (1963).
5. MASS. Gmr. LAws ch. 140, §14 (1932).
6. MISS. CODE ANr. §7158 (1952).
7. MAsS. GN. LAws ch. 140, §14 (1932).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. §62-709 (1955).
9. FLA.STAT. §509.191 (1968).
10. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§85.18, .19 (1968); KAN. Gm. STAT. ANN. §36-201
(1949); ME. RFv. STAT. ANN. ch. 100, §42 (1954).
11. See [1953-1954] FLA. A-r'y GEN. BnzmAm.
REP. 55, stating that the
owner or operator of a hotel or apartment house would not be criminally liable for
justifiably locking a delinquent tenant out of his room or apartment and thereby
preventing him from recovering his personal property. This implies that the owner
or operator would be liable if his action was not justified. See also Kloeppel v.

Bradford, 183 Fla. 695, 182 So. 839 (1938).
12. FLA. STAT. §811.021 (1963).
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lent guest obtain property by false personation' 3 or, when the provisions are directed at fraudulent procurement of credit, the false
representation as to financial standing must be in writing.14 Thus,
when credit and services are obtained by unwritten false pretenses or
representations' 5 the innkeeper is without protection except that afforded by specific legislation directed at his unique situation.
In addition to a basic statute to facilitate the prosecution of fraudulent guests, legislation is needed to allow the innkeeper to act with
reasonable legal safety when he has probable cause to believe he is
being defrauded. Absence of such legislation renders the protection
afforded by any statute in this area little more than illusory. The innkeeper finds himself vulnerable to actions of false imprisonment, false
arrest, and malicious prosecution. The constant threat of such action
provides the professional skipper with a powerful weapon to deter the
innkeeper from acting until he is virtually positive of the fraud; by
then the skipper has skipped leaving worthless luggage and a debt
'that, as a practical matter, is generally uncollectible.
PRESENT LEGISLATION

Innkeeper statutes throughout the nation range from those that are
very short' 6 and relatively ineffectual to those that are more comprehensive and provide some measure of protection. 17 Florida's recently
amended statutes"" fall within the latter group, but nevertheless provide far less than desirable protection. The laws vary considerably
with regard to the type of establishment covered. For example, the
r ' 9 as contrasted
Delaware statute includes "any inn, tavern or hotel"
with California's broad statute, which encompasses "any hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house,20 lodging house, apartment house, bungalow,
13.

FLA. STAT.

§817.02 (1963).

14. FLA. STAT. §§817.03, .05 (1963).
15. It appears that this is a major 'loophole" in Florida law, one in dire need
of corrective legislation. However, a discussion of this broad area is beyond the
scope of this Note. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §40A-16-16 (Supp. 1963) for an innkeeper law that includes a general provision on obtaining "services" by false pretenses.
16. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §602 (1953): "Whoever absconds from any inn,
tavern or hotel in this state without first paying the keeper or proprietor thereof
any bill owed for board and lodging, shall be fined $25.00 or imprisoned 80 days,
or both."
17. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§161, 162 (1957); NEv. REv. STAT. §205.
445 (1960); WAsH. REv. CODE §19.48.110 (1957).
18. FL&. STAT. §§509.151, .161, .162 (1963), see APPENDIX.
19. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, §602 (1953).
20. See State v. McRae, 170 N.C. 712, 86 S.E. 1039 (1915).
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motor court, motel, or auto camp."21 The present trend is toward
more extensive coverage, as evidenced by recent amendments to existing legislation. 22 All such statutes require an intent to defraud, and
many include "prima facie" provisions specifying that proof of certain
enumerated acts by the defendant will raise a rebuttable presumption 23 of fraudulent intent.2 4 These acts generally include departure
without paying or offering to pay, 2 5 surreptitious removal or attempted
removal of baggage, 26 failure to pay on demand, 27 and payment by
check or other instrument that is not backed by sufficient funds. 28
Statutory provisions making an act evidence of intent generally
have been upheld as constitutional. 29 Such provisions have withstood
attacks that they deny trial by jury,30 permit imprisonment of the
defendant for bad debts,31 and constitute an attempt to use a criminal
statute for collection of civil debts.3 2 They do not shift the burden of
proof from the prosecution, 33 although they do provide an effective
means of establishing at least prima facie evidence of the requisite
fraudulent intent. The constitutionality of the "prima facie" provisions
of Florida Statutes, section 509.161 has never been specifically tested

21. CAL.PEN. CODE §537.
22. See, e.g., Amuz. BEv. STAT. ANN. §13-318 (Supp. 1963); FLA.
§§509.151, .161, .162 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN.§40A-16-16 (Supp. 1963).
23. See State v. Hill, 166 N.C. 298, 81 S.E. 408 (1914).

24. E.g., FLA.STAT. §509.161 (1963);

KAN.GOn. STAT.

STAT.

ANN.§36-207 (1949);

R.I. Gm;. LAws ANN. §11-18-26 (1956).

25.
26.
27.
28.

See Miss. CODE A;NN. §7155 (1952).
See NEv. REV. STAT. §205.445 (1960).
See APx. STAT. ANN.§41-1909 (1947).
WAm. 1_Ev. CODE §19.48.110 (1957).

29. Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1160 (1927).
tion, 5 TuL. L. 1Ev. 178 (1931).

See Brosman, The Statutory Presump-

30. State v. Kingsley, 108 Mo. 135, 18 S.W. 994 (1892).
31. State v. Benson, 28 Minn. 424, 10 N.W. 471 (1881); State v. Yardley, 95
Tenn. 546, 82 S.W. 481 (1895); In re Milecke, 52 Wash. 312, 100 Pac. 743
(1909).
32. State v. Sibley, 152 La. 825, 827, 94 So. 410 (1922). The court stated
that the innkeeper statute had "no application where credit has been given; and
hence does not cover the case of one who had no intent to cheat or defraud, who
was not expected to pay immediately upon procuring such food or accommodations, and who simply finds himself unable to pay at some future time, when his
bill becomes due. But it seems to us that it is a proper exercise of legislative functions to declare and punish as an offender, one who, intending to cheat and defraud, procures food or accommodation, on the representation, as it were, that he
has the wherewith to pay for it and will do so immediately, and yet fails or refuses
to do so." Ibid.
33. Commonwealth v. Berryman, 72 Pa. Super. 479 (1919).
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in this regard in any reported cases, but the Florida Supreme Court has
upheld similar "presumption" provisions of other Florida statutes.84
Compounding Crime and Extortion
The primary interest of the innkeeper, except in extreme cases of
fraud, is to receive payment for services rendered, rather than to
prosecute the guest. Present law leaves the innkeeper on a tightrope
in his attempts to obtain payment. If the accommodations were in
fact fraudulently obtained, the innkeeper who agrees not to prosecute
in return for full or partial payment of the debt is guilty of compounding a crime, a misdemeanor at3 common law.38 However, Florida's
"compounding a crime" statute " refers only to felonies. Since violation of Florida Statutes, section 509.15137 constitutes only a misde3
meanor, an offer not to prosecute would not be criminally actionable U
The innkeeper, however, must be extemely careful not to couch any
offer in threatening terms, for in so doing he could subject himself to
prosecution for extortion. 39 In this regard it is advisable that the innkeeper in Florida promise only that "he will state to the prosecuting
officer and to the court the unadorned fact that restitution has been
made."40
False Arrest
A major problem confronting the innkeeper lies in the onerous
threat of actions for false arrest and false imprisonment. Statutes with
strong prima facie evidence provisions, coupled with well informed
prudence on the part of the innkeeper, tend to decrease this problem.
Nevertheless, without a strong statutory assurance of protection, the
innkeeper, as well as the peace officer, is understandably reluctant to
84. City of Coral Gables v. Brasher, 120 So. 2d 5, 9 (Fla. 1960). In upholdiag the validity of a statute providing that any impairment of health of police officers caused by certain diseases resulting in disability shall be presumed to have
been suffered in the line of duty unless shown to the contrary, the Florida Supreme Court stated: "the general rule that so long as there is a rational connection
between the fact proven and the ultimate fact presumed and the adverse party is
given reasonable opportunity to proffer evidence and have a jury decide the facts
in issue, there is no violation of due process or equal protection. . .o" Ibid. See
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Webb, 112 Fla. 449, 150 So. 741 (1933).
85. State v. Carver, 69 N.H. 216, 89 AUt. 973 (1898).
86. FLA. STAT. §843.14 (1968).
87. See APPENDIX.
88. Compounding a crime is a problem in states such as New Mexico whose
innkeeper statute prescribes varying degrees of felonies depending on the amount
of the fraud. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40A-16-16 (Supp. 1968).
89. FLA. STAT. §836.05 (1963).
40. Address by E. A. Shure, Surety Company Claim Men's Forum, Jan. 16,
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act. Such reluctance works strongly in favor of 'the skipper. 41 Any
unlawful detention, no matter how slight, will support an action for
false imprisonment. 42 In an unusual case,48 a Missouri hotel owner
followed a departing guest whom he claimed owed fifty cents. He
then induced a police officer to attempt to collect the money. The
court held that when, in the presence of the hotel owner, the officer
threatened the guest so as to require him to return and pay the amount,
the owner had at least impliedly ratified the acts of the officer and was
liable for false arrest.
The FloridaInnkeeper Statutes4 4
The problem of false arrest has been somewhat lessened by Florida
Statutes, section 509.162, which permits the innkeeper or a peace
officer to take into custody a person suspected of having committed
fraud and to detain him for "such reasonable period of time as may be
necessary to bring him before the nearest magistrate" Part (2) of the
same statute similarly authorizes the innkeeper or peace officer to
detain a guest absconding with property of the establishment. On its
face this enactment presents a number of improvements over past
legislation, but there are a number of glaring weaknesses still unremedied. A major weakness is found in the provision that authorizes
only the manager or assistant manager, in the absence of the owner or
keeper, to make an arrest, leaving a night desk clerk who lacks the
status of assistant manager powerless to act. Certainly, it is not advisable to insert a broad and ambiguous provision such as that contained
in the recently enacted "skipper law" of Texas.45 There, it is specified
that the departing person appear before the "room clerk or other agent
of the establishment." 46 During the 1961 Florida Legislature an attempt was made to amend section 509.162. Senate Bill No. 882, which
1946. As a practical matter, the county solicitor's office in many parts of Florida
will often aid in the matter of collection to avoid any risk of prosecution of the
innkeeper for extortion.
41. The innkeeper can avoid the risk of prosecution or suit for false arrest by
giving the facts to the state attorney's office, instead of swearing out a warrant
himself. This method, however, overlooks the need for immediate detention and
provides the skipper added time to escape.
42. See Martin v. Lincoln Park West Corp., 219 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1955);
Watkins v. Oaldawn Jockey Club, 86 F. Supp. 1006 (D.C. Ark. 1950), affirmed,
183 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1950).
43. Gibson v. Ducker, 170 Mo. App. 135, 155 S.W. 462 (1918). See also
Knowlton v. Ross, 114 Mo. 18, 95 Atl. 281 (1915).
44. See APPENDIX.
45. Texas Laws 1963, ch. 476, at 1193.
46. See Ors. ATr'Y Gm;. TEXAs, May 23, 1963, which points out the possible
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was defeated, would have expanded the statute to include an "owner
or keeper including manager, assistant manager, desk clerk or other
person in authority." The omission of this broader enumeration in
the present act apparently indicates a legislative intent to limit the
persons who may act under the statute. It appears, however, that the
present version is too restrictive. It is suggested that both problems
would be alleviated by addition of the provision, "desk clerk or other
person in charge of the establishment by authority of the owner or
keeper in the absence of the owner or keeper. .. "
A second weakness of section 509.162 is apparent in the paradox of
the provision of part (2) that limits a taking into custody to the premises when a person "has taken" property illegally from the premises. It
seems unlikely that once property is taken from the premises, the person will be available on the premises for detention. This section
should be amended to include any person who "has taken or is taking"
personal property belonging to the establishment illegally from the
premises. This would allow an innkeeper to detain a person who is
apprehended removing property of a value under one hundred dollars. Under present Florida law, since such removal constitutes only
petit larceny, 47 a misdemeanor, the innkeeper is powerless to act with48
out an arrest warrant.
The innkeeper's right of detention is further limited to the premises. This restriction is desirable to prevent the manager or assistant
manager from pursuing violators and becoming involved in a possible
49
altercation.
It is important to note that the present act was originally characterized as the "innkeeper's shoplifting bill." 50 This is due to its marked
similarity to Florida's Shoplifting Law,51 which allows a merchant to
detain and take into custody a person whom he has probable cause to
believe has unlawfully taken merchandise. Section (3) of the Shoplifting Law52 additionally specifies that the peace officer and the
merchant or his employee shall be immune against civil and criminal
actions of false imprisonment and false arrest if probable cause for the
confusion that may result from the use of the words "other agents." The "skip-

per" could possibly avoid the statutory presumption of departure with intent not to
pay by protesting his bill with some employee of the hotel not connected with the
management.
47. FLA. STAT. §811.021(3) (1963).
48. 6 FiA. LAw & PAcrricE §174 (1957).
49. Interview, supra note 3.
50. This characterization was made in the 1961 Florida Legislature with respect to proposed House Bill No. 90, which was defeated.
51. FA. STAT. §811.022 (1963).
52. Ibid.
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detention or arrest can be shown.5 3 This law has been recently upheld in an action for false arrest against a merchant. A similar provision intended for the protection of the innkeeper was incorporated in
the proposed version of Florida Statutes, section 509.162 in 1963, but
was deleted as unacceptable. A provision of this nature is not only
highly desirable, but a dire necessity for successful use of statutes
concerning the defrauding of an innkeeper.
It is suggested that a "detention" provision should be specifically
limited in scope to avoid possible abuse of this privilege by the innkeeper. Florida Statutes, section 509.162 allows detention for "such
reasonable period of time as may be necessary to take him before the
nearest magistrate." Although this is a desirable limitation on the
authority of the peace officer, a narrower restriction is necessary with
respect to the innkeeper. The innkeeper's concern is not to bring the
"suspected skipper" before a magistrate, but rather to detain him long
enough to allow police officials to handle the matter. This is particularly true since detention often takes place at night when a magistrate
may not be available, although a police official should be. To avoid an
unreasonable detention by the innkeeper the statute should specify the
right of the innkeeper to use only "reasonable non-deadly force," and
restrict the time of detention to that necessary to turn the suspect over
to the authorities. For example, the statute might specify one hour as
the maximum permissible period of detention.
To provide for the situation in which a guest honestly forgets his
wallet, 55 the innkeeper should be required to comply with reasonable
requests of the guest during the period of detention. For example,
the guest should be allowed to call his wife or other persons who
could verify his forgetfulness and thus negate any inference of an
intent to defraud.
53. Isaiah v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 111 Ohio App. 537, 174 N.E.2d 128
(1959), where the court held that such provisions do not shift the burden of proof
and that the defendant still must show probable cause.
54. Rothstein v. Jackson's of Coral Gables, Inc., 133 So. 2d 3831 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
55. Concern for the protection of innocent persons in this and similar situations was evidenced by objections in committee to the original bill. An attempt
was made to insert the phrase, "intended or premediated," before the phrase, "the
failure to make payments," wherever it appeared in the parts of the bill that correspond to §509.151 and §509.161 as presently enacted. Although this addition
was contained in the submitted amended version of Senate Bill No. 441 (1963),
the phrase was deleted in the final bill as enacted. If the phrase had not been
deleted, a proof of intent would have been required in even the "presumption
section" of the statute, thus destroying the utility of such a section to the prosecutor. Interview, supra note 3.
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The present Florida statute 6 evinces still another vital weakness.
Since violation of its provisions constitutes a misdemeanor, the existing
penalty provision affords an inadequate deterrent to many professional
skippers who run up bills of hundreds and even thousands of dollars. 57
Unfortunately, this is true of the innkeeper laws found in the great
majority of states. The desirable solution would be to make the first
offense a misdemeanor and the second offense a felony,58 and to make
the amount obtained by fraud determinative of whether the offense is
a felony or a misdemeanor,5 9 as is done in Florida today in differentiating between petit larceny and grand larceny. 60 This should further
be coupled with a statutory authorization of an offer to compromise as
recognized by Wyoming.61 Thus, first and minor offenders would not
be penalized heavily, and the habitual criminal, who would probably
have difficulty in raising the amount of a large bill, would be effectively
penalized. Moreover, the risk of prosecution for compounding a felony
and extortion would be minimized by the compromise provision.
Malicious Prosecution

The threat of an action for malicious prosecution is an effective
weapon in the hands of the professional skipper. Such actions have
been successfully prosecuted against innkeepers.62 In Florida the
63
plaintiff must prove malice as well as the lack of probable cause.
Evidence of false representation establishing probable cause for the
arrest and prosecution will constitute a valid defense to such action, 4
as will a showing that the action was instituted upon advice of reputable counsel. 6 6 In this area there appears to be no need for a specific
statutory provision to protect the innkeeper from harassment by threats
and actions of malicious prosecution; the innkeeper can best protect
himself by consultation with counsel prior to prosecuting.
56. Fr.&STAT. §509.151 (1963).
57. See Interview, supra note 3.
58. Am. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-318 (Supp. 1963).
59. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40A-16-16 (Supp. 1963).
60. FLA. STAT. §811.021 (1963).
61. Wyo. STAT. ANN.§33-250 (1957).
62. E.g., Saner v. Bowker, 69 Mont. 463, 222 Pac. 1056 (1924), conviction of
the innkeeper for malicious prosecution was upheld where the facts revealed that
prior to the prosecution by the innkeeper a valid credit arrangement existed;

Galzian v. Henry, 71 W. Va. 292, 76 S.E. 440 (1912), where an innkeeper had
plaintiff arrested but failed on trial or in defense of the malicious prosecution

action to show proof of an arrest warrant.
63. See White v. Miami Home Milk Producers Ass'n, 143 Fla. 518, 197 So. 125
(1940); Hopke v. O'Byrne, 148 So. 2d 755 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
64. Andrews v. Hotel Sherman, 138 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1948).
65. Cragin v. DePape, 159 Fed. 691 (5th Cir. 1908); Adler v. Segal, 108 So.
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Delay in Payments
Several innkeeper statutes contain specific provisions making the
statute inapplicable when there has been an agreement for a delay in
payments. Such provisions vary from a "special agreement for delay
in payment,"66 'to an "agreement in writing for more than ten days
delay in such payment."6" It is not necessary that "lack of delay" be
alleged by the prosecution; rather the agreement for delay is a matter
of defense. 68 The Florida statute that specifies "an agreement in
writing for delay in payment" 69 should provide ample protection
without the unnecessary complication of a specified period for such
delay.
Posting
Several states require that the statute be posted in various places.7°
Such provisions raise the question whether the statute will be enforceable if the innkeeper fails to post it as required. Some statutes
specify that there can be no conviction until the innkeeper makes it
"appear to the court that such notice was posted." 1 A problem is
raised ff there is merely a requirement for posting without any specificity as to the effect of the failure to post. 2 Florida avoids this
problem, as do the majority of states, by omitting any requirement
for posting. 73 The present trend is toward elimination of posting
requirements, as evidenced by the repeal of provisions in Idaho 74 and,
2d 773 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
66. E.g., Miss. CoDE Aim. §7155 (1952);
LAws ANN. §11-18-26 (1956).

N.J. BEv.

STAT.

§2A:111-19

(1951); R.I. GEN.

67. E.g., ME. I.nvo STAT. ANN. ch. 100, §45 (1954); Mn-.
Env. STAT. §41-128 (1960).

STAT.

§827.08

(1961); NEB.

68. State v. Tumidge, 93 S.W.2d 1031 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936).
69. FLA. STAT. §509.151 (1963). See also S.D. CODE §13.4206 (1939).
70. E.g., ALA CODE tit. 24, §20 (1958); MASS. Gmi . LAWS ch. 140, §13
(1932); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §33-251 (1957).
71. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 24, §20 (Supp. 1961); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §68-1
-3 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. §52-9905 (1933).
72. E.g., Orno REv. CODE ANN. §2911.14 (Page 1954); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§33-251 (1957). See Ors. ATr'Y GEn. Omo, No. 2951 (1931), where it is stated
that such failure to post would not be a defense to a prosecution. But see Ops.
ATr'y Gir.NEw MExsco, No. 4999 (1947-1948).
73. See Ely v. Charellen Corp., 120 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1941), where mere
failure to post a copy of Fla. Laws 1933, ch. 16042, §40, which provides that a
hotel owner is not liable for loss of guest's jewelry not deposited with the hotel,
was held not a ground to impose liability upon such hotel. This indicates a judicial de-emphasis on the importance of posting in Florida.
74. Idaho Sess. Laws 1903, at 410, repealed by Idaho Sess. Laws 1951, ch.
112, §13.
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very recently, in New Mexico 75
Other Weaknesses in Present Legislation
76
Statutes, such as the recently enacted "Skipper Law" of Texas,
that apply only to persons obtaining board or lodging by various
means of deception are exceedingly difficult to enforce in that they
require proof that the fraudulent representation be made at the time
the food, lodging, or other accommodations were obtained.7 7 Florida
Statutes, section 509.151 avoids this difficulty by merely referring to
obtaining such accommodations with a fraudulent intent, with no
reference to the time or means by which such intent was evidenced.
This determination is instead made a part of the establishment of a
prima facie case and evidence of fraudulent intent.
At least two states in requiring a demand for payment specify a
period of time to allow payment before the demand and refusal to pay
may be used to establish prima facie evidence of fraudulent intent.
Louisiana allows five days; 78 South Dakota allows ten.79 A requirement of delay following a demand for payment appears unwarranted
and unnecessary, and would certainly work to the advantage of the
professional skipper who, in most instances, will have departed long
before expiration of the statutory period.
There appears to be a general reluctance to include "regular
boarders" within the scope of innkeeper statutes. Illinois, for example,
specifically excepts regular boarders from its statute. 0 Such exclusion
seems unnecessary, since the fact that a person is a regular boarder
would generally negate a fraudulent intent.8 ' The New York courts,
when faced with this question, have refused to convict when a guest
has paid regularly for six months and then fails to pay, 2 when a regular boarder openly leaves a hotel and openly takes his baggage, 3 and
when a guest merely leaves to obtain money to pay a bill, absent any

75. N.M. Laws 1899, ch. 36, §1, repealed by N.M. Laws 1963, ch. 303, §80-1.
76. Texas Laws 1963, oh. 476, at 1193.
77. Whatley, Analysis of Texas House Bill No. 514 "Skipper Law," released

by Texas Hotel & Motel Ass'n, 1963.
78. LA. REv. STAT. §21:22 (1950).
79. S.D. CoDE, §13.4206 (1939).
80. ILL. REV. STAT., ch.71, §32 (1961).
81. See McLemore v. State, 55 Okla. Crim. 155, 27 P.2d 172 (1933), where
the defendant who obtained lodging from a rooming house operator on credit was
held not guilty of obtaining lodging with intent to defraud, notwithstanding his
subsequent failure to make payment. The court particularly noted that the defendant was not a transient, and that he resided at the boarding house.
82. People v. Astor, 269 App. Div. 250, 55 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
83. People v. Klas, 79 Misc. 452, 141 N.Y. Supp. 212 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1913).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

11

1964]

NOTES
Florida Law
Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [1964], Art. 6

suspicious circumstances. 8 4 A statutory exclusion of regular boarders
appears unwise because skippers frequently manage to stay for weeks
or months at one establishment before arousing the suspicions of the
85
innkeeper.
Regarding the removal of baggage, most provisions, including those
of Florida, merely specify "surreptitious" removal. An additional provision covering removal by force, menace, or threats 6 is desirable to
avoid the defensive claim by the skipper that his removal was not
surreptitious.
Other desirable statutory provisions not present in the Florida
statute or in those of the majority of states, include payment by negotiable paper on which payment is refused8 7 and use of a fictitious
name,88 as constituting prima facie evidence of the intent to defraud.
Other states 9 make the act of false registration a separate offense. It
is further suggested that all statutory provisions, which refer to the acts
of failure to pay on demand and absconding without paying as prima
facie evidence of fraudulent intent,90 should include the words "in
ffll"9 1 after the word "payment" wherever it appears. This would
prevent a failure of proof when the skipper leaves a token or comparatively insignificant amount behind to avoid prosecution.
Prosecutions for defrauding an innkeeper have failed for reasons
other than the inadequacy of legislation. For example, defendants
have been acquitted because of averments that the false representaions were made when the defendant was leaving; 92 statements on
the stand by the innkeeper that he was not deceived by the false
representations, thus negating any reliance on the fraud; 93 or improper
instructions, such as the statement that the refusal to pay, if believed
by the jury, was proof of guilt instead of prima facie evidence of intent subject to explanation and rebuttal.94

84. People v. Nicholson, 25 Misc. 266, 55 N.Y. Supp. 447 (Ct. Spec. Sess.

1898).
85. Interview, supra note 8.
86. See CAL. PEir. CODE §537.
87. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 24, §19 (Supp. 1961); OHso REV. CODE ANN. §2911.
14 (Page 1954); WASH. 11v. CoDE §19.48.110 (1957).
88. E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §36-207 (1949); Mo. R1v. STAT. §419.080
(1959); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §1503 (1961).
89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §601 (1953).

90. FLA. STAT. §§509.151, .152 (1963).
91. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§161, 162 (1957).
92. Garrett v. State, 125 Tex. Crim. 351, 68 S.W.2d 507 (1934).
93. Chauncey v. State, 130 Ala. 71, 30 So. 403 (1901).
94. Commonwealth v. Berryman, 72 Pa. Super. 479 (1919).
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CONCLUSION

A survey of present innkeeper legislation reveals a general lack of
uniformity and numerous weaknesses. Even the broader and more
comprehensive statutes omit necessary provisions found in some of the
shorter ones. To alleviate the unique problems of the innkeeper in
dealing with fraudulent guests, the following principles are suggested
as guidelines for the drafting of future legislation:
(1) The enumeration of the type of establishments should
specifically include all businesses that primarily provide food or
accommodations for transient guests.
(2) The classification and extent of the penalty should vary
with the amount of the fraud, with a more severe penalty provided
for second offenders.
(3) There should be a clause or separate statute enumerating
specific acts as prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud. In
addition to the provisions of Florida Statutes, section 509.161, the
following acts should be presumptive of fraudulent intent, providing there are not other conflicting statutory provisions of the particular state:
(a)
(b)
refused.
(c)
(d)
(e)

The giving of a false or fictitious name.
Payment by negotiable paper on which payment was
Failure to pay in full on demand.
Removal of baggage by force or threats.
Surreptitiously causing baggage to be removed.

(4) The innkeeper and the peace officer should have a right of
detention when they have probable cause to believe, and do believe, that the statute is being violated. However, the innkeeper's
right of detention should be limited to a specific period of time,
with authorization for the use of reasonable non-deadly force.
(5) Bath the innkeeper and the peace officer should be immunized against civil and criminal liability for false arrest when
there is probable cause for detention.
(6) Detention by the innkeeper should be limited to the
premises.
(7) Detention should be allowed when there is probable cause
to believe, and actual belief, that personal property has been or is
being taken from the premises.
(8) Dismissal of the action should be encouraged upon payment in full of the amount owed; providing that such payment is
made prior to arraignment.
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(9) The right to accept compromise offers should be specifically
authorized to avoid prosecution for compounding crime.
(10) The innkeeper should be specifically immunized against
prosecution for extortion based on offers not to prosecute or offers
to compromise, providing that such offers are not couched in a
threatening manner.
(11) The enumeration of those persons allowed to act under
the statute should be broad enough to include, in addition to the
owner or keeper, all persons properly in authority in the absence of
the owner or keeper. Special care must be taken to avoid ambiguities such as the term "other agents," while at the same time the
other extreme of too much specificity must be avoided to meet the
need for flexibility.
This list is not intended to be complete; nor is it a panacea for the
problems of the innkeeper in this field. Rather, it is hoped that these
suggestions will be considered in drafting the stronger and more comprehensive legislation needed to meet the unique business situation of
the innkeeper.
The major problem confronting the legislator involves a balancing
of interests. On the one hand is the need to protect the innocent person from unnecessary detention by the over-zealous innkeeper. On the
other hand is the need of the innkeeper for a limited right of detention, unrestrained by a fear of civil or criminal liability for false arrest.
The likelihood that the privilege of detention will be abused in a business that depends so heavily upon "good will" should be realistically
balanced against the "imaginary horribles" that weaken the needed
legislation and serve largely to protect the fraudulent guest.
GERALD F.
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APPENDIX
FrA.

STAT.

ch. 509 (1963):

HoTEL AND RESTAURANT CoMn ISOx.

Section 509.151 Obtaining lodging with intent to defraud; penalty.
Any person who shall obtain food, lodging or other accommodations at any
hotel, motel, apartment house, rooming house, inn, boarding house, trailer park or
restaurant, with intent to defraud the owner or keeper thereof, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the
county jail not to exceed 3 months or by fine not exceeding $100.00; provided,
that if any owner or keeper, including manager or assistant manager, in the absence of the owner or keeper, of such establishment has probable cause to believe,
and does believe, that any person has obtained food, lodging or other accommodations at such establishment with intent to defraud the owner or keeper thereof, and
upon demand for payment being made, and there being no dispute as to the
amount owed, failure to make payment shall constitute prima facie evidence of
intent to defraud; provided, further, that the provisions of this section shall not
apply where there has been an agreement in writing for delay in payments.
Section 509.161 Rules of evidence in prosecutions.
In prosecutions under §509.151, proof that lodging, food or other accommodations were obtained by false pretense or by false or fictitious show or pretense of
any baggage or other property, or by absconding without paying or offering to pay
for such food, lodging or accommodations, or by surreptitiously removing or attempting to remove baggage, or if any owner or keeper, including manager or
assistant manager, in the absence of the owner or keeper, of such establishment
has probable cause to believe, and does believe, that any person has obtained
food, lodging or other accommodations at such establishment with intent to defraud the owner or keeper thereof upon failure to make payment upon demand
being made therefor, and there being no dispute as to the amount owed, shall
constitute prima facie evidence of the fraudulent intent mentioned in this chapter.
Section 509.162 Obtaining lodging or food with intent to defraud; detaining
of violator and arrest by police officer.
Any peace officer or owner or keeper, including manager or assistant manager, in the absence of the owner or keeper, of any hotel, apartment house, tourist camp, motel, rooming house, trailer court or restaurant, who has probable cause
to believe, and does believe:
(1) That any person has obtained food, lodging or other accommodations at
such establishments with intent to defraud the owner or keeper therof, as referred
to in §509.161, or
(2) That any person has taken personal property belonging to said establishments illegally from the premises, may take such person into custody on the premises and detain him for such reasonable period of time as may be necessary to take
him before the nearest magistrate.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

15

